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This paper develops a two-country model to reexamine the e®ects
of a tari® reduction with a consumption tax increase that has been
addressed under the assumption of a small open economy. We show that
this reform does not always improve welfare and government revenue
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1 Introduction
Reductions and eliminations of protective trade measures, e.g., import
tari®s and export subsidies, have had the most remarkable impact on
expansion of the world trade °ow.1) It is also well-established that
liberalized trade bene¯ts a country both theoretically and empirically.2)
* I am grateful to Eric W. Bond, Fumio Dei, Wilfred J. Ethier, Sugata Marjit,
Michihiro Ohyama, and other participants of the IEFS Japan Annual Meeting
2011 for helpful comments. Any remaining error is our own responsibility.
** Corresponding author: School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University. Uega-
hara 1-1-155, Nishinomiya, Hyogo 662-8501, Japan. Tel: +81-798-54-7066. Fax:
+81-798-51-0944. E-mail: kenjifujiwara@kwansei.ac.jp.
1) Baier and Bergstrand (2001, p. 22) ¯nd evidence that `Tari® reductions still
explain almost three times as much trade growth as transport-cost declines.'
2) See, for instance, Helpman (2011) for a non-technical account of the gains-
from-trade theory. OECD (2009, Ch. 4) provides data suggesting the positive
gains from trade liberalization.
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Despite the above recognition of the welfare-improving aspect, a
number of countries have still been reluctant to liberalize trade. One of
the main reasons is a fear that trade liberalization inevitably entails a
decrease in trade tax revenue, which accounts for a high share in total
government revenue.3)
Given the above stylized facts, there is a large literature that links trade
liberalization and a domestic tax reform. Among others, Hatzipanayotou
et al. (1994) establish a novel result that one unit of tari® reduction
and the same unit of consumption tax increase necessarily improve
welfare and government revenue of a small open economy. Keen and
Ligthart (2002) generalize this win-win result, but Kreickemeier and
Raimondos-M¿ller (2008) call our caution since the same strategy does
not always improve market access, which is de¯ned by a value of imports
evaluated at world prices.
This paper is also along this line of research, our purpose is quite
di®erent. We reconsider the above-described tari®-tax reform in a
two-country model in which world prices (or terms of trade) are variable.
All of the previous works introduced above adopt a common assumption
of a small open economy primarily because it well approximates the
developing countries. While this justi¯cation is to some extent acceptable,
even developing countries can have more or less market power in the
international market depending on commodities. For example, the
behavior of the countries Middle-East Asia and Africa typically has a
substantial in°uence on the world price of crude oil. Given this reality,
we should turn attention to the case of a large open economy with
variable world prices, and examine the validity of the results that assume
3) IMF (2005, p. 3) provides a detailed report, concluding that `revenue from
trade taxes ¢ ¢ ¢ continues to be a major source of government ¯nance in
many low- and middle income countries.'
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a small open economy.4)
To this end, we develop a two-country, two-good, perfectly competitive
model. We show that the point-by-point tari®-tax reform above is
no longer win-win, i.e., does not guarantee a welfare and revenue
improvement. The underlying intuition is simple; the reform leads to a
deterioration of terms of trade. The total e®ect is thus determined by
the positive e®ect shown in the existing literature and the negative e®ect
of terms of trade deterioration. In contrast, this reform unambiguously
improves market access, which is not always the case for a small open
economy. In these respects, our results are quite di®erent from those
of the existing literature. Finally, we will provide a simple su±cient
condition for all of welfare, government revenue and market access to
increase, i.e., the reform is win-win-win.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model and gives
a comparative static outcome that is used in the subsequent argument.
Section 3 investigates the e®ect of the point-by-point tari®-tax reform
on welfare, government revenue and market access. Section 4 concludes.
2 A model
We construct a perfectly competitive two-country, two-good model
comprising of Home and Foreign. An asterisk (*) is attached to variables
and functions of Foreign. Home imports Good 1, and levies an import
tari® t and a consumption tax ¿ both of which take a speci¯c (per-unit)
form. Hence, the consumer price and the producer price are respectively
given by p + t + ¿ and p + ¿ , where p is the world price of Good 1
in terms of Good 2. Supposing that Foreign observes laissez-faire, the
4) We do not claim that we are the ¯rst to take into account variable world
prices. There is a literature of tari® reforms in a large-country context, e.g.,
Turunen-Red and Woodland (1991, 1993).
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trading equilibrium is characterized by a system:
e(p+ t+ ¿; u) = r(p+ t) + ¿ep(p+ t+ ¿; u)
+t[ep(p+ t+ ¿; u)¡ rp(p+ t)] (1)
e¤(p; u¤) = r¤(p) (2)
ep(p+ t+ ¿; u) + e
¤
p(p; u
¤) = rp(p+ t) + r
¤
p(p); (3)
where u and u¤ are utility of each country, e(¢) and e¤(¢) are an
expenditure function, r(¢) and r¤(¢) are a GDP (revenue) function, and
subscript p stands for a partial derivative with respect to the price. All
the functions are assumed to satisfy the standard properties.5) Eq. (1)
is an expenditure-income equality of Home, where ¿ep(¢) is consumption
tax revenue, and t[ep(¢)¡ rp(¢)] is tari® revenue. Eq. (2) is a counterpart
of Foreign, and (3) is a world market-clearing condition of Good 1. This
system determines u; u¤ and p, given the tax rates t and ¿ .
To know the e®ects of a simultaneous change in two taxes, let us
di®erentiate the above system totally:26664
eu ¡ (¿ + t)epu 0 ep ¡ rp ¡ ¿epp ¡ t(epp ¡ rpp)
0 e¤u¤ e
¤
p ¡ r¤p
epu e
¤
pu¤ epp + e
¤
pp ¡ rpp ¡ r¤pp
37775
26664
du
du¤
dp
37775
=
26664
(¿ + t)epp
0
¡epp
37775 d¿ +
26664
¿epp + t(epp ¡ rpp)
0
rpp ¡ epp
37775 dt; (4)
where subscripts u and u¤ refer to a partial derivative with respect to
u and u¤, respectively. We assume a Warlasian stability of the world
market of Good 1, which requires the determinant of the coe±cient
matrix denoted by ¢ to be negative:
5) See any elementary textbook of trade theory, e.g., Dixit and Norman (1980),
Woodland (1982), Wong (1995), and Feenstra (2003).
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 
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
+ eue
¤
u¤
 
epp + e
¤
pp ¡ rpp ¡ r¤pp

< 0: (5)
And, we make another assumption:6)
Assumption (Hatta normality condition). eu ¡ ¿epu > 0.
If one assumes a quasi-linear preference with zero income e®ect on the
demand of Good 1, this condition is de¯nitely satis¯ed. The subsequent
sections utilize these preliminaries to identify the e®ects of tari®-tax
reforms.
3 E®ects of a tari®-tax reform
Based on the comparative statics outcomes in the last section, this
section examines the e®ects of a strategy of a tari®-tax reform that has
been received considerable attention in the literature. We focus on a
reform of d¿ = ¡dt > 0, i.e., one unit of tari® reduction is accompanied
by one unit of consumption tax increase. As Keen and Ligthart (2002,
2005) and Kreickemeier and Raimondos-M¿ller (2008) claim, this reform
has been recommended by the IMF and the World Bank since it is not
only simple but also needs no knowledge of the economy's fundamentals
(utility and production functions) that are generally unknown to the
government. Under this reform, the right-hand side of (4) becomes
6) See Hatta (1977a, b).
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(¿ + t)epp
0
¡epp
37775 d¿ ¡
26664
¿epp + t(epp ¡ rpp)
0
rpp ¡ epp
37775 d¿ =
26664
trpp
0
¡rpp
37775 d¿:
3.1 Welfare
The e®ect of this reform on u; u¤ and p is obtained as
@u
@¿

d¿+dt=0
=
rpp

(ep¡rp)e¤u¤¡¿e¤u¤epp+t
 
e¤pp¡r¤pp

e¤u¤¡
 
e¤p¡r¤p

e¤pu¤
	
¢
(6)
@u¤
@¿

d¿+dt=0
= ¡ (ep ¡ rp) (eu ¡ ¿epu) rpp
¢
> 0 (7)
@p
@¿

d¿+dt=0
= ¡ (eu ¡ ¿epu) e
¤
u¤rpp
¢
> 0: (8)
From (6), the e®ect of the reform on Home welfare is ambiguous. This
sign ambiguity comes from two opposing e®ects. The ¯rst e®ect is
explained in details in Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994) and Keen and
Ligthart (2002) in a context of a small open economy. Invoking that the
e®ect of a tari® reduction is equivalent to a reduction in a consumption
tax and a production subsidy, the present reform has no net e®ect
on consumption, and enhances a production e±ciency by decreasing
subsidy-distorted production.
While the foregoing argument, which is based on an assumption of a
small open economy, is still valid in the two-country model, the reform
is detrimental through terms of trade deterioration (See Eq. (8)). This
is because production expansion in Home decreases the Home import,
which, in turn, causes a rise in the world price. Therefore, the total
e®ect on welfare depends on the magnitude of the positive production
e±ciency e®ect relative to the negative terms of trade e®ect.
3.2 Revenue
In this subsection, we turn attention to the e®ect on government
revenue. Government revenue T is de¯ned by the sum of consumption
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tax revenue and tari® revenue:
T = ¿ep(p+ t+ ¿; u) + t [ep(p+ t+ ¿; u)¡ rp(p+ t)] ; (9)
where u and p are a function of the two tax rates through (1)-(3).
Having this in mind, di®erentiating (9) with respect to ¿ and t yields
@T
@¿
= ep + ¿

@p
@¿
+ 1

epp +
@u
@¿
epu

+t

@p
@¿
+ 1

epp +
@u
@¿
epu ¡ @p
@¿
rpp

(10)
@T
@t
= ep ¡ rp + ¿

@p
@t
+ 1

epp +
@u
@t
epu

+t

@p
@t
+ 1

epp +
@u
@t
epu ¡

@p
@t
+ 1

rpp

: (11)
Subtracting (11) from (10), the revenue e®ect of the reform d¿ = ¡dt > 0
is
@T
@¿

d¿+dt=0
=rp +

¿ [(ep¡rp)epu¡euepp]e¤u¤+t
 
e¤pp¡r¤pp

e¤u¤¡
 
e¤p¡r¤p

e¤pu¤
	
rpp
¢
;
(12)
where use is made of (6) and (8).
The sign of (12) is indeterminate for the following reason. As is
mentioned in the discussion of the welfare e®ect, the present reform is
essentially the same as a reduction in production subsidy. Therefore, the
government saves a subsidy payment by rp, which increases government
revenue. On the other hand, a reform-induced rise in the world price of
Good 1 (deterioration of terms of trade) increases domestic production
and decreases consumption. Therefore, both the subsidy payment and the
consumption tax revenue are likely to increase, from which government
revenue can both increase and decrease. This is expressed by the second
term in (12). To sum, the total e®ect is inevitably ambiguous.
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3.3 Market access
The last criterion that evaluates tari®-tax reforms is market access.
As stressed in Ju and Krishna (2000), Anderson and Neary (2007),
and Kreickemeier and Raimondos-M¿ller (2008), welfare and government
revenue do not su±ce to assess the reform e®ect because the market
access issue is increasingly important for developing countries and the
international institutions. Given this trend, we address the market access
aspect of the reform. Market access M is de¯ned by the value of imports
at the world price:7)
M ´ p [ep(p+ t+ ¿; u)¡ rp(p+ t)] : (13)
The e®ect on M of a change in ¿ and t is
@M
@¿
=
@p
@¿
(ep ¡ rp) + p

@p
@¿
+ 1

epp +
@u
@¿
epu ¡ @p
@¿
rpp

(14)
@M
@t
=
@p
@t
(ep ¡ rp) + p

@p
@t
+ 1

epp +
@u
@t
epu ¡

@p
@t
+ 1

rpp

: (15)
Subtracting (15) from (14), the market access e®ect of the reform
becomes
@M
@¿

d¿+dt=0
= ¡ (eu¡¿epu)

(ep¡rp)e¤u¤¡p
 
e¤pp¡r¤pp

e¤u¤¡
 
e¤p¡r¤p

e¤pu¤
	
rpp
¢
> 0:
(16)
Eq. (16) states that the market access e®ect is de¯nitely positive,
which is a good property of the reform. This is obvious since both p and
ep ¡ rp increase after the reform. In a model of a small open economy,
Kreickemeier and Raimondos-M¿ller (2008) demonstrate that the market
access e®ect is ambiguous. However, in the present large-country case,
such an ambiguity vanishes, and we have a positive market access e®ect.
This is because the increase in p dominates the decrease in ep ¡ rp,
7) See the papers listed in the main text.
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namely, the terms of trade e®ect dominates the production e±ciency
e®ect.
The ¯ndings we have derived are summarized.
Proposition. The point-by-point tari®-tax reform (i) has an ambiguous
e®ect on welfare, (ii) has an ambiguous e®ect on government revenue,
and (iii) improves market access.
As mentioned, the above-described reform is appealing since it is
a simple formula, and requires no knowledge of preferences (utility
functions) and production technologies (production functions) both of
which are extremely di±cult to know. Although this reform guarantees
an improvement of both welfare and government revenue for a small
open economy, the same is no longer valid for a large country. In
this respect, the reform needs closer caution than has been expected.
Nevertheless, we can ¯nd a situation in which the above reform becomes
win-win-win. It is stated in:
Corollary. The point-by-point tari®-tax reform improves all of welfare,
revenue, and market access if the consumption tax is zero and the tari®
is prohibitively high.
Proof. Evaluating (6) and (12) at ¿ = 0 and the prohibitive tari® at
which ep ¡ rp = r¤p ¡ e¤p = 0 holds, we have
@u
@¿

d¿+dt=0
=
t
 
e¤pp ¡ r¤pp

e¤u¤rpp
¢
> 0
@T
@¿

d¿+dt=0
= rp +
t
 
e¤pp ¡ r¤pp

e¤u¤rpp
¢
> 0:
Since the reform de¯nitely improves market access, we have established
| 85 |
?????? 67 ?? 3 ?
the above result. jj
This result needs few explanations. In the present situation, the
positive e®ect induced by enhanced production e±ciency is larger than
the negative e®ect coming from deterioration of the terms of trade.
Although the assumption that ¿ = 0 and an initially prohibitive tari®
is undoubtedly restrictive, it seems true of several developing countries.
In this sense, the above result provides a useful insight.
Remark. It is possible to consider the case of an export tax, which
accounts for an important share of government revenue. In this case,
the welfare and revenue e®ects of an export tax reduction accompanied
with the same unit of consumption tax increase are ambiguous for both
a small and large economy.8)
4 Conclusion
This paper has reconsidered the e®ectiveness of a tari®-tax reform
under variable terms of trade. In particular, we have focused on one
unit of tari® reduction with one unit of consumption tax increase.
It is shown that the reform has a possibility of reducing welfare as
contrasts to the existing literature establishing a welfare improvement
in a context of a small open economy. Furthermore, the reform may
reduce government revenue, which is the most serious concern developing
countries have over trade liberalization. In contrast, the market access
e®ect of the reform is positively evaluated. To summarize our arguments,
we should be more careful about the implementation of the tari®-tax
reform that has been positively assessed in the existing literature because
8) The proof, which is available from the author upon request, is straightforward
just by noting that t < 0 and d¿ = dt > 0 in the export tax case.
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such a reform prescription can no longer be e®ective if the trade volume
of the country a®ects the world price.
Despite the above novelties, we have left much unexplored. First, we
have used a canonical two-country, two-good model. It is important
to reconsider our results in a higher-dimensional setting. Second, we
should pay attention to imperfect competition. Relative to the literature
that assumes perfect competition, there is a much smaller literature
that allows for imperfect competition, e.g., Keen and Ligthart (2005),
Naito and Abe (2008), and Fujiwara (2012). It is another fruitful task
to extend our insight to incorporate imperfect competition. Third, our
analysis rests on a static model. Following the approach of Naito (2006a,
b), taking into account the dynamic e®ect on growth should make much
sense. Finally, we have focused on unilateral reforms, namely, only
Home implements tari®-tax reforms.9) It is worth trying to extend the
model to allow both Home and Foreign to make reforms. In this sense,
the ¯ndings we have derived should be a starting point rather than a
¯rmly-established result.
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